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The year 1988 marked the bicentennial of the arrival of the British
to colonize Australia. The Australian Federal Government planned
a massive celebration of that event. There is one group, the Australian
Aborigines, that was not impressed. A number of legal challenges
were mounted in the Australian courts and other forms of protest
are on-going.' This paper examines in the context of international
law the acquisition of what is now known as Australia.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The "discovery" and "settlement" of Australia occurred in stages.
On November 24, 1642, Abel Tasman sighted the southwest coast of
Van Diemen's land (now called Tasmania). He landed on that territory
and purported to take possession on behalf of the Dutch on December
3.2 The British explorer Captain James Cook was given instructions
in 1768 to discover what was supposed to exist as New Holland. He
landed on the shores of Sydney (Botany Bay) on April 29, 1770, and
by August 22 of that year he had taken possession of the entire east
coast of the Australian mainland.3
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See infra notes 106-12, 122 and accompanying text.
2 He had instructions dated August 13, 1642 from the Governor General of the
Dutch East Indies, Antonio van Diemen. ABEL JANSZOON TASMAN'S JOURNAL OF His
DISCOVERY OF VAN DIEMEN'S LAND AND NEW ZEALAND IN 1642, at 136 (J. Heeres
ed. 1898); see also A. DALRYMPLE, DiscovERIEs MADE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN
PREVIOUS TO 1764 (1767).
' At every landing point, Captain Cook demonstrated the taking by displaying
the British colours and cutting an inscription in a tree. 1 THE JOURNALS OF CAPTAIN
JAMES COOK ON His VOYAGES OF DISCOVERY, THE VOYAGES OF THE ENDEAVOUR 1718-
1771, at 304-88 (J. Beaglehole ed. 1955).
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With the loss of the North American colonies, Britain needed a
new place to send troublesome convicts. In 1786, it was decided that
Australia would be suitable, 4 and Captain Arthur Philip was appointed
the first governor. The first attempt to occupy the continent was
made on January 26, 1788, when a party of 1,030 people landed at
what is now Sydney Harbour. Governor Philip held a formal cere-
mony on February 7 at which the British flag was raised.' The
colonization of Australia had begun, but during the next three dec-
ades, the British settlement remained confined to within about 50 to
100 miles of Sydney. Between 1824 and 1851 expansion was fast,
and the British population of Tasmania and New South Wales rose
to 400,000.6 With regard to Western Australia, it was not until May
2, 1829 that Captain Fremantle took formal possession. 7 The first
British settlers arrived there in 1829 and 1830.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES ON ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY
A. Inter-Temporal Law
Because the acquisition of Australia occurred some 200 years ago,
it will not be analyzed here on the basis of contemporary rules of
international law; rather, inter-temporal law requires that the analysis
focus on the 1770s. In the Right of Passage over Indian Territory
case,' the International Court of Justice ruled that the validity of
the Treaty of Poona of 1779 between Portugal and the indigenous
4 An expedition to Southern Africa found that place to be unsuitable. The
decision to deport convicts to Australia was made pursuant to an Act of 1784, 24
Geo. III ch. 56.
1 This ceremony was in accordance with instructions of April 25, 1786. See 1
GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA, HISTORICAL RECORDS OF AUSTRALIA 1788-1796 1, 9
[hereinafter H.R.A.].
6 New South Wales originally comprised the eastern half of the continent. It
was later divided into four colonies. Tasmania became a separate colony in 1825
(population, all British, was 5000); Victoria became a separate colony in 1851
(population 70,000); South Australia received colonial status in 1836 (its population
in 1850 was 63,700). See Evatt, infra note 116, at 30.
1 Vancouver first laid claim to King George's Sound in 1791. 1 G. VANCOUVER,
A VOYAGE OF DISCOVERY TO THE NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN AND ROUND THE WORLD
35 (rev. ed 1967)(1798) (describes the symbolic acts of possession performed). See
also DIARY AND LETTERS OF ADMIRAL SIR C.H. FREMANTLE, G.C.B. RELATING TO
THE FOUNDING OF THE COLONY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA 1829 (Lord Cottesloe ed.
1928).
1 Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), [1960] 3 I.C.J. Pleadings
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Indian entity of Maratha "should not be judged upon the bases of
practices and procedures which have since developed only gradually. " 9
Again, in the Island of Palmas (or Miangas) Arbitration,'0 the sole
arbitrator made the following finding:
Both Parties are also agreed that a judicial fact must be appreciated
in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in
force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or fails to
be settled."
Further, in the Western Sahara opinion,' 2 the International Court of
Justice observed that the questions before it had "to be interpreted
by reference to the law in force at that period," namely, "the time
of colonization by Spain."' 3
B. The Rules of Acquisition
There are five main modes of acquisition of territory under inter-
national law: cession, occupation, prescription, accretion, and con-
quest.' 4 In the Australian context, occupation is perhaps the most
relevant and so deserves discussion at some length. One of the difficult
questions faced in early international law was whether or not to
regard indigenous entities outside Europe as sovereign. A number of
propositions were put forward on the question between the sixteenth
and nineteenth centuries, the three main ones being 1) recognition
that indigenous entities had complete sovereignty over their territory;
2) that these entities had only a restricted or conditional sovereignty
over their territory; and 3) total rejection of such sovereignty.
A leading exponent of the first view was a Spaniard, Franciscus
A. Victoria. He argued at the time of the discovery of America that
the territory could not in law be designated as terra nullius because
the native American Indians were in possession of the land. Victoria
also pointed out that the mere fact that Europeans considered the
Indians "sinners" or "infidels" did not preclude the Indians from
9 Id. at 35.
1o Island of Palmas (or Miangas) Arbitration (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.Int'l Arb.
Awards 829 (1928).
" In that case, the effect of the discovery of Spain was determined by the rules
of international law of the 16th century. Id.
,2 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12.
Id. at 38-39.
" See, e.g., R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
6-7 (1963); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 547-78 (H. Lau-
terpacht 8th ed. 1955).
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enjoying their sovereignty like Christians. 5 Four centuries later, the
Victorian school was to receive unequivocal support from the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the person of Judge Ammoun. Com-
menting on the so-called "scramble for Africa" in the Namibia
opinion, he said:
It was a monstrous blunder and a flagrant injustice to consider
Africa south of the Sahara as terra nullius to be shared among the
Powers for occupation and colonization, when even the sixteenth
century Victoria had written that Europeans could not obtain sov-
ereignty of the Indies by occupation for they were not terra nullius. 16
The second proposition was to the effect that sovereignty in native
communities was conditional or limited. The Swiss jurist Vattel was
a proponent of this view. According to Vattel and his followers, the
sovereignty of entities outside Europe should only be recognized where
such peoples had a settled life and had made the entire territory
productive. Vattel advanced the thesis that "[when] the Nations of
Europe which are too confined at home, come upon lands which the
savages have no special need of and are making no present and
continuous use of, they may lawfully take possession of them and
establish colonies in them.' ' 7
Finally, there was the rejectionist camp which maintained that
territories of non-European communities were terra nullius pure and
simple. For example, Martens-Ferrao, a Portuguese jurist and states-
man, took the view that cessions granted by non-European leaders
were of no legal effect because their nations did not "possess any
constituted sovereignty, that being a political right derived from
civilization."' 8 In a similar vein, Westlake required "a native gov-
's M. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (1926). Similarly, other writers like Ayla observed that
communities outside Europe should be recognized as sovereign because "sovereignty
over the earth was not given ordinarily to the faithful alone but to every reasonable
creature". Id. at 13.
16 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971
I.C.J. 6, 86 (the Namibia opinion). See also Judge Ammoun's comments in the
Western Sahara Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. at 86.
,1 1 E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 37-38 (C. Fenwick trans. 1916)(1758).
Vattel's view has been used as one of the justifications for the acquisition of Australia.
See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
11 M. LINDLEY, supra note 15, at 19.
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ernment capable of controlling white men or under which white
civilization can exist."19
After a detailed analysis of the three schools of thought, Lindley
concluded that "there had been a persistent preponderance of juristic
opinion in favor of the proposition that lands in the possession of
any backward peoples who are politically organized ought not to be
regarded as if they belong to no one. ' 20 He observed further that
how "crude and rudimentary" one perceived such governmental in-
stitutions to be did not matter. The relevant factor was whether
"there is some kind of authoritative control of a political nature
which has not been assumed for some merely temporary purpose,
such as a war." 2'
C. State Practice
In accordance with the juristic opinion just discussed, imperial
European powers generally acquired their territories by cession or
conquest. In spite of the belief held by some Europeans that Africa,
Asia, and what is now commonly called the developing world, were
geschichtslos (lacking history), with the consequence that they could
be treated as being in vOlkerrechtlichhorrenlos2 (that is, in a legal
vacuum), the evidence is that African or Asian indigenous nations
were regarded as territorially sovereign and dealt with as such.
1. Africa
The claim has been made that Africa at the time of its colonization
lacked politically organized entities. For instance, Syatauw writes:
In this respect Asia differs from Africa. At the time of the first
sea voyages to Asia, Africa did not consist of well-organized states,
J9 j. WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 39-57, 157
(L. Oppenheim ed. 1914). Generally speaking, it seems that scholars up to the
eighteenth century did not have trouble recognizing the sovereignty of native com-
munities. See, e.g., M. LINDLEY, supra note 15, at 18. It was in the nineteenth
century, when Europeans needed an ex post facto rationalization for the territories
they were colonizing around the globe, that they attempted to elevate "civilization"
to a legal postulate.
20 M. LINDLEY, supra note 15, at 20.
11 Id. at 30. Earlier on in his work, Lindley had expressed his conclusion more
lucidly: "It appears that their opinion may be fairly said to amount to this: that
wherever a country is inhabited by people who are connected by some political
organization, however primitive and crude, such a country is not to be regard as
territorium nullius and open to acquisition by occupation." Id. at 17.
21 Alexandrowicz, Empirical and Doctrinal Positivism in International Law, 47
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 286 (1974-5).
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though it had known some important states .in its past. 3
On the contrary, there is overwhelming evidence to refute that claim.
The historical fact is that at the time of arrival of the Europeans on
the African shores, there were flourishing within these shores inde-
pendent, well-organized units with stable governments of varying
political and social development .24 In the circumstances, the predom-
inant mode of acquisition became cession and hundreds of treaties
were concluded between the Europeans and the African nations. 25
Where the Africans were not willing to negotiate treaties, the Eur-
opeans resorted to military combat. For example, the British fought
the West African Kingdom of Asante three times; it was only in 1900
that superior British military might prevailed. Similarly, Samori Toure's
Empire and Shaka's Zulu land had to be defeated by the French and
British respectively before these two powers could legitimately lay
claim to the land based on annexation or prise de possession.26
Although the Berlin Act of 188527 was not clear on the point, the
practice of European colonists clearly indicates that Africa was not
regarded as terra nullius, notwithstanding the fact that in 1888 the
Institut de droit International meeting at Lausanne failed to accept
the proposal "that occupation by a civilized state ought to have as
its basis arrangements with the chiefs of the Aboriginal tribes. ' 2
The now infamous "scramble for Africa" did not provide a primary
mode of acquisition. At best, it was a strategy aimed at preventing
23 J. SYATAUW, SOME NEWLY ESTABLISHED ASIAN STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (1961).
24 Wallace-Bruce, Africa and International Law - The Emergence to Statehood,
23 JouRAL OF MOD. AFRICAN STUD. 575 (1985) (and authorities cited therein).
23 E. HERTSLET, THE MAP OF AFRICA BY TREATY (1986); C. ALEXANDROWICZ,
THE EUROPEAN-AFRICAN CONFRONTATION, A STUDY IN TREATY MAKING (1973).26 Wallace-Bruce, supra note 24.
27 Article 34 of the Berlin Act merely provided for notification the other powers
of territorial acquisitions, while Article 33 required them to ensure the establishment
of authority on the acquired lands, particularly to protect existing rights, freedom
of trade, and freedom of transit under agreed conditions. 76 BRIT. FOREIGN & STATE
PAPERS 19 (1885). The U.S. delegate noted: "Modern international law follows
closely a line which leads to the recognition of the right of native tribes to dispose
freely of themselves and of their hereditary territory. In conformity with this principle
my government would gladly adhere to a more extended rule, to be based on a
principle which should aim at the voluntary consent of the natives whose country
is taken possession of in all cases where they had not provoked the aggression . .."
J. WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 138 (1894).
28 Session de Lausanne 1888, 2 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
712 (1928).
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the European rush for territories from degenerating into chaos and
inter-European conflict in full view of the "backward" people. In
the words of Alexandrowicz, the scramble was "for legal titles in
international law. ' 29
2. Asia
Like Africa at the time of the European "discoveries", Asia at
that time possessed independent or semi-autonomous political units.
They included the Marathas and other Indian nations, Kotte, Kandy,
Tamil Patam, Siam, and China. Again, the Europeans found the
doctrine of terra nullius inapplicable.30 In the Island of Palmas (or
Miangas) Arbitration, the Netherlands based its claim (successfully)
on the conventions between the Dutch East India Company and the
native princes of Tabukan and Taruna.31
3. New Zealand
New Zealand is of immense interest to the present inquiry because
of its proximity to, and close relations with, Australia. The indigenous
Maoris call the country now known as New Zealand, Aotearoa. It
is believed that Abel Tasman (Dutch) was the first European to
discover the territory in December 1642, but it was the British Captain
Cook who charted the islands in 1769 and 1770 and claimed them
on behalf of the British Crown. On February 6, 1840, the United
Kingdom signed the Treaty of Waitangi with 80 indigenous tribal
chiefs.12 Article 1 reads:
The chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zea-
land, and the separate and independent chiefs who have not become
members of the Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of
England, absolutely and without reservation, all the rights and pow-
ers of sovereignty which the said Confederation or individual chiefs
respectively exercise or possess or may be supposed to exercise or
possess over their territories as the sole sovereigns thereof.33
29 ALEXANDROWICZ, supra note 25, at 12.
10 C. ALEXANDROWICZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
IN THE EAST INDIES (16TH, 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES) 41-49 (1967).
1' 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 829 (1928).
32 This applied largely to the densely populated North Island. See Evatt, infra
note 116.
33 This was to ward off the French from laying immediate, claims to the territory.
The treaty comprising the two texts (English and Maori) were sent around the country
to be signed by the Maori leaders; over 500 signed. Both texts are reprinted in C.
19891
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4. The Americas
The existence in North America of a wide variety of indigenous
political systems, ranging from the simple to the complex, as man-
ifested, for example, in the Haudensaunee,34 presented the colonizers
with no alternative to cession and conquest as methods of acquisition.
In Canada, perhaps the most important document on the matter is
the Royal Proclamation of 1763 in which King George III referred
to "the several Nations and Tribes with whom we are connected and
who live under our protection. ' 35 After 1867, the Indians agreed,
with some minor exceptions, to cede their rights to designated ter-
ritories. In the United States, even after the revolution in 1776, the
Federal Government continued to negotiate such treaties, and between
1778 and 1868 no less than 394 were concluded.16 It appears that in
South America the Spanish resorted to conquest rather than claim
terra nullius. 
3
D. Analysis of State Practice
From this brief account, it is clear that in the relevant period under
consideration, if any territories were regarded as terra nullius they
were indeed few, and may be seen as the exception rather than the
norm. In the Clipperton Island Arbitration,38 the arbitrator held that
a small coral lagoon reef in the Pacific Ocean, some 670 miles south
of Mexico was terra nullius, and France's proclamation of sovereignty
ORANGE, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 257-266 (1987). See E. SCOTT infra note 114.
Busby, the British resident, had arranged for the Maori chiefs to declare New Zealand
an independent state. H.R.A., supra note 4, at 562-63; see also J. WARD, BRITISH
POLICY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC 75-76 (1950).
-' In the Haudensaunee the Iroquois Confederacy had an unwritten yet formal
constitution which was committed to memory and recited every five years by the
elders. There was a bicameral legislature and a code of laws which governed behavior.
A Council of Elders saw to the general affairs of the polity; leadership was hereditary.
See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS No.
40, INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 13 (1983).
11 See generally Mason, Canadian and United States Approaches to Indian Sov-
ereignty, 21 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 423 (1983); P. CummIwo & N. MICKENCBERG, NATIVE
RIGHTs IN CANADA (2d ed. 1972).
36 See G. BROWN & R. MAGUIRE, INDIAN TREATIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(1979). However, in 1871 Congress ended this practice. Indian Appropriations Act
of 1871, 16 Stat. 570 (1871).
37 H. HERRING, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA, FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE
PRESENT 117-49 (1963).
31 Arbitral award on the subject of the difference relative to the sovereignty over
Clipperton Island (France v. Mexico) (1931), reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390
(1932) (the Clipperton Island Arbitration).
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in November 1858 was therefore valid.3 9 But the territory at issue in
that arbitration was a desolate reef. Wherever there were people with
some form of socio-political organization, the European colonists
generally acquired the territory by cession or conquest.
When the International Court of Justice faced the issue in the
Western Sahara opinion, it provided what may be said to be the
locus classicus on the subject of terra nullius:
Whatever differences of opinion there may have been among jurists,
the state practice of the relevant period indicates that territories
inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political organ-
ization were not regarded as terra nullius. It shows that in the case
of such territories the acquisition of sovereignty was not generally
considered as effected unilaterally through 'occupation' of 'terra
nullius' by original title but through agreements concluded with local
rulers. On occasion, it is true the word 'occupation' was used in a
non-technical sense denoting simply acquisition of sovereignty; but
that did not signify that the acquisition of sovereignty through such
agreements with the authorities of the country was regarded as an
'occupation' of a 'terra nullius' in the proper sense of these terms.
On the contrary, such agreements with local rulers, whether or not
considered as an actual 'cession' of the territory, were regarded as
derivative roots of title, and not original titles obtained by occupation
of terra nullius.4°
It is noteworthy that the Court did not make any reference to
"civilization", and the positivist doctrine of the nineteenth century
was thus dealt a fatal blow. 41 In modern times, there are rare situations
in which terra nullius may be claimed. 42
A comment is in order here on the validity of the various treaties
of cession referred to. In the Island of Palmas (or Miangas) Arbi-
tration, arbitrator Max Huber commented that cessions granted by
39 Id.
40 1975 I.C.J. at 39.
' For detailed discussion, see Andrews, The Concept of Statehood and the
Acquisition of Territory in the Nineteenth Century, 94 LAW Q. REv. 409 (1978);
see also Note, Sovereignty Over Unoccupied Territories - The Western Sahara De-
cision, 9 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L. L. 135 (1977).
41 One such area is the creation of new islands. Dingley, Eruptions in International
Law: Emerging Volcanic Island and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, 11 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 121 (1978); Comment, The U.S. Claim to Wrangel Island: The Dormancy
Should End; 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 140 (1981); Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute
Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, 14
VA. J. INT'L L. 221 (1974).
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leaders of indigenous communities "are not, in the international law
sense, treaties or conventions capable of creating rights and obligations
such as may, in international law, arise out of treaties. ' 43 Without
going into the details of this debate, it suffices to say that at the
very minimum the parties to the agreement were ad idem as to the
fact that they were creating binding legal relations. In the Rights of
Passage over Indian Territory case, the International Court did not
have difficulty finding that the Treaty of Poona of 1779 and the two
sanads of 1783 and 1785 were regarded by both the Portuguese and
the Marathas as "valid and binding upon them, and [both] gave
effect to [their] provisions."" Even the sole arbitrator in the Island
of Palmas arbitration conceded that such treaties are "not wholly
void of indirect effects on situations governed by international law."
In effect, he upheld the conventions of 1677 between the Netherlands
and the native princes of the Islands of Sangi.4
It would seem that in the Western Sahara opinion the International
Court implicitly accepted the international validity of treaties made
with indigenous leaders. Spain did not argue that the Rio de Oro
and Sakiet El Hamia were terra nullius. Instead, Spain based its
claim on the treaties with the independent African nations, of which
the Bonelli Treaty of 1884 was a prototype. The form in which the
question was put to the Court did not allow it to pronounce on the
issue. But neither Morocco nor Mauritania challenged the validity of
the treaties as international law instruments, and this validity was
apparently assumed by all, including the Court.
III. ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIA - THE EMPnucAL EVIDENCE
In light of the foregoing, the primary factual issue in the present
analysis is whether at the time that Governor Philip established the
convict colony at Sydney Cove there were people living in Australia,
and if so, whether they were politically organized so as to qualify
41 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 858.
- [1960] 3 I.C.J. Pleadings at 35. "There is no denying that at the time neither
the Maratha Government nor the Portuguese government had any doubt that the
said Treaty had in fact been concluded and was valid. The two Governments were
agreed on that." Id. at 78 (Armand-Ugon, J., dissenting).
41 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 858. Other instances where the treaties have been
relied upon include the Bulama Arbitration (Britain v. Portugal) (1870), in 3 E.
HERTSLET, MAP OF AFRICA BY TREATY 988 (3d ed. 1909); Delagoa Bay Arbitration
(1875) in id. at 996; Contra Cayuga Indian Claims, 6 R.Int'l Arb. Awards 173,
186-87 (1936) (where the treaty was treated as a contract).
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as territorially sovereign. In answering this question, it will be nec-
essary to take a brief look at the relevant anthropological and his-
torical material. An international tribunal seized of the matter will
surely have to examine that background material to be able to resolve
the legal issues. In the Namibia advisory opinion, the point was made
by the International Court that, "Normally to enable a court to
pronounce on legal questions, it must also be acquainted with, take
into account, and if necessary, make findings as to the relevant factual
issue. '" 46 This was reaffirmed in the Western Sahara opinion. 47
It is not in dispute that there were people living in Australia in
1788: an estimated 300,000 Aborigines comprising over 500 indigenous
communities were scattered about the continent. 4 Each group had a
recognized territory which it claimed as hunting, religious, and food-
gathering grounds, the size of which varied according to such factors
as fertility, quantity and quality of natural resources. Large amounts
of these territories-much of which is desert-were in northwestern
South Australia, the middle-eastern part of Western Australia, and
the central-west of the Northern Territory. Some of the groups with
large territories were the Aranda, Walbiri, and Wuradjeri, to name
a few. At the other end of the spectrum were the smaller communities
generally found along the cost such as the Canjani, Wogeman, Dja-
mindjund, and Gorindji. 49
With regard to Aboriginal political organization, two opposing
views have been put forward. On the one hand, there are those who
argue that the Australian Aborigines did not have any political or-
ganization. L.R. Hiatt, for example, writes that Aborigines had "no
formal apparatus of government, no enduring hierarchy of authority
and no recognized political leaders." 50 Similarly, Lauriston Sharp,
1971 I.C.J. at 15.
41 1975 I.C.J. at 11.
48 This figure has recently been substantially revised. Reynolds, for example, states
that there were as-many as a half million Aborigines. H. REYNOLDS, THE LAW OF
THE LAND 8 (1987).
49 Throughout this paper the past tense is used for consistency, but much of the
material is still relevant today. On Australian Aborigines, see A. ELKIN, THE Aus-
TRALAN ABORIGINES (1938 & reprint 1979); R. & C. BERNDT, THE WORLD OF THE
FIRST AuSTRALLANS (1964, 1977, & reprint 1982); K. MADDOCK, THE AusTRALIAN
ABORIGINES: A PORTRAIT OF THEIR SOCIETY (1972); A. CAMPBELL, THE ABORIGINES
AND ToRREs STRAIT ISLANDERS (1958); G. BLAINEY, THE TRIUMPH OF THE NOMADS
(1976).
10 Hiatt, Authority and Reciprocity in Australian Aboriginal Marriage Arrange-
ment, 6 MANKIND 468 (1967).
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who studied the Yir-Yoront nation, stated that there were no insti-
tutions for government in the whole of North Queensland. He ob-
served, "all of this is simply kinship. In the field of conduct, there
is no distinguishable social organization for economics, for religion,
or for government."'" In a similar fashion, Megitt, who studies the
Walbiri, or "desert people", concluded: "In short, the community
had no recognized political leaders, no hierarchy of government." 52
On the other side of the debate are those who contend that Ab-
origines did possess political organization. Peter Sutton, in a study
of the Cape York Peninsula in 1978, reported the existence of clans
with senior persons, "big men" or "bosses" at regional levels.53 Next,
von Sturmer, studying the Kuju-Nganychama community of Queens-
land came across the ceremonial "big man" or "boss" (pama manu
thaiyan).5 4 In 1979, John Bern launched a fierce attack on the Sharp-
Megitt-Hiatt formulation. Bern insisted that the latter ought to be
faulted on two grounds: first, their conclusions were false, and second,
the wrong questions were posed in their investigations.55 Bern's view
has since been endorsed by other anthropologists.5 6
11 Sharp, People Without Politics in AM. ETHNOLOGICAL SoC'Y, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 1958 ANNUAL MEETING, SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRACY 1,
7 (1958).
52 M. MEGGITT, DESERT PEOPLE, A STUDY OF THE WALBIRI ABORIGINES OF CENTRAL
AUSTRALIA 250 (1962 & reprint 1984). One of the early explorers, Eyre, who reportedly
travelled widely among the Aborigines, was categorical that they were "without
government or restraint". 1 J. EYRE, JOURNALS OF DISCOVERY INTO CENTRAL AUS-
TRALIA AND OVERLAND FROM ADELAIDE TO KING GEORGE'S SOUND 1840-1, at 384
(1845).
1 P. Sutton, Wik: Aboriginal Society, Territory and Language at Cape Keerweer,
Cape York Peninsula Australia (Ph.D. thesis, University of Queensland 1978).
14 J. von Sturmer, The Wik Region: Economy, Territoriality and Totemism in
Western Cape York Peninsula North Queensland (Ph.D. Thesis, University of
Queensland 1978).
11 Bern, Ideology and Domination: Towards a Reconstruction of Australian Ab-
original Social Formations 50 OCEANIA 118 (1979). In 1974 he had reached a similar
conclusion after studying south-eastern Arnhem Land. J. Bern, Blackfella Business,
Whitefella Law (Ph.D. Thesis Macquarie University 1974).
56 In 1982, Peter Sutton and Bruce Rigsby pointed out that political organization
was definitely known and practiced by the Aborigines. According to Sutton and
Rigsby, traditional Aboriginal political life has been misrepresented because anthro-
pologists have preferred to believe that Aborigines lack the competitiveness and
shrewdness of urban industrial peoples. Sutton and Rigsby, People with Politicks:
Management of Land and Personnel on Australia's Cape York Peninsula in N.
WILLLAMS & E. HUNN, RESOURCE MANAGERS: NORTH AMERICAN AND AUSTRALIAN
HUNTER-GATHERERS 155, 156 (1982). In 1984, Athol Chase also found the "big
man" and "boss" in the eastern Cape York area. Chase, Belonging to Country:
Territory, Identity, and Environment in Cape York Peninsula Northern Australia
in L. HIATT, ABORIGINAL LAND OWNERS (1984).
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The remaining issue is whether in 1788-when the British laid the
nucleus of the Australian colonies in Sydney-the Eora, Duruk, and
other indigenous entities in the immediate area had a social and
political organization. From the evidence the answer should be af-
firmative. It is indeed pointless to go so far as to unearth the "big
man" or "boss". Political organization, certainly in the eighteenth
century and prior, ought not to be characterized solely in terms of
a visible centralized governmental system. There were societies outside
Europe which, though not exhibiting the paraphernalia of European-
style government, were nonetheless not treated as terra nullius."
Today, such societies can be looked upon as democracy par excellence.
The argument that, "there is no state in the sense of an institution
standing over and above the various local and kin groupings and
asserting a monopoly on the use of force", 5" is clearly inappropriate
in the context of pre-twentieth century non-European political or-
ganization. It should be remembered that in the earlier period at
issue here, the economic, social, religious and political aspects of life
were inseparable.
At any rate, there is evidence indicating that religious leaders
exercised authority which extended into secular areas. Berndt and
Berndt in an excellent work on Australian Aboriginal life have es-
tablished that there was no hard-and-fast demarcation between the
religious and the secular in that Aboriginal society. The society was
primarily concerned with maintenance of order. In the event of
disputes, there was "intervention by recognized leaders or by men
acknowledged as having considerable experience in social affairs." 5 9
In substance, it is not really disputed that Aborigines had a means
of regulating their society long before European arrival. Even writers
like Meggitt, who maintain that Aborigines did not have a political
organization, concede that law did operate in that society.60 The
people who are believed by Hiatt and others to have had no settled
legal system clearly did not have difficulty distinguishing between
17 See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
38 K. MADDOCK, supra note 49, at 42-3.
19 R. & C. BERNDT, supra note 49, at 366. Strehlow who studied the Aranda of
Central Australia reached similar conclusions. Strehlow, Geography and the Totemic
Landscape in Central Australia: A Functional Study in R. BERNDT, AUSTRALIAN
ABORIGINAL ANTHROPOLOGY 105, 109, 116 (1970).
60 Meggitt writes: "The totality of the rules expresses the law, djugarum, a term
that may be translated as 'the line' or 'the Straight or true way."' M. MEGGITT,
supra note 52, at 251. See also N. TINDALE, ABORIGINAL TRmES OF AuSTRALIA (1974).
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accepted modes of behavior and unauthorized ones. The Aborigines
were also conservationists who preserved their environment well.
Therefore, it is my respectful submission, based on the available
evidence, that the Australian Aboriginal society had a social and
political organization. These Aborigenes did not have a centralized
political system such as the Asante and Swazi of Africa, the people
of Siam, the Marathas of Asia, or the Maoris of New Zealand, but
they had a "segmentary lineage system ' 6' in which governmental
power was diffused. In the Gove Land Rights Case Justice Blackburn
held that there existed among Aborigines a governmental system with
laws which "provided a stable order of society." 62 I concur with
Berndt and Berndt: "Our conclusion has been that despite the weak-
ness of law in a general sense and in its maintenance (along with its
socio-spatial limitations) it was certainly not lacking, even though
central authority was on the whole ill-developed. ' 63
IV. WAS AUSTRALIA A TERRA NULLIUS?
In Cooper v. Stuart,64 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
had to decide on appeal from the Supreme Court of New South
Wales whether a reservation in a Crown grant of lands in fee simple
was valid. The Committee held that New South Wales was a terra
nullius because it was "a colony which consisted of a tract of territory
practically unoccupied, without settled inhabitants or settled law, at
the time when it was peacefully annexed to the British dominions. ' '65
The Australian courts have reaffirmed this decision on a number
of occasions. Perhaps the most celebrated case is Coe v. The Com-
monwealth of Australia and the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.6 The appellant, an Aborigine
from Sydney, argued that the British "wrongfully claimed possession
and occupation" of the land which his ancestors had possessed since
time immemorial. The majority of the High Court of Australia re-
jected the appeal and reaffirmed Cooper v. Stuart. Justice (later Chief
61 See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
62 Milirrpum v. Nabalco, 17 F. L. R. 141, 267-9 (1971) (the Gove Land Rights
Case).
63 R. & C. BERNDT, supra note 49, at 365 (2d ed. 1977).
6 Cooper v. Stuart, 14 App. Cas. 286 (1889).
65 Id. at 291.
66 53 A.L.R. at 403 (1979).
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Justice) Gibbs described the notion of Australia as terra nullius as
"fundamental ' 67 to the legal system of Australia.
In Wacando v. The Commonwealth and the State of Queensland,6
the plaintiff desired to develop beche-de-mer fishing on the seabed
surrounding and between Darney Island and other islands, and to
engage in the exploration for and the exploitation of petroleum
resources therein. Both the Federal and State Governments sought
to prevent this on the ground that the plaintiff did not have a license
pursuant to the Federal Continental Shelf (Living Natural Resources)
Act of 1968, the Queensland Fisheries Act of 1976 and other associated
legislation. The plaintiff Mr. Wacando, an inhabitant of Darnley
Island (situated about ninety-two miles northeast of Cape York Pen-
insula), brought an action in the High Court against both Govern-
ments, claiming, inter alia, that Darnley Island (on which he and his
father were born and owned land) and all islands in Torres Strait
beyond 60 miles did not fall within the boundaries of the State of
Queensland, and that consequently their respective statutes had no
application to the islands and the submerged lands adjacent to them.
The principal argument of the plaintiff was that as Darnley Island
was never part of New South Wales, the island did not become part
of Queensland in 1859 when the colony of Queensland was separated
from the colony of New South Wales. Moreover, argued the plaintiff,
the Letters Patent of 1878 and the Queensland Coast Islands Act of
1879 were not effective to achieve that result, as the boundaries had
already been fixed by an Imperial Act. The High Court held that
although it was "true that the boundaries of Queensland were mis-
described in the Letters Patent", Darnley island had been part of
Queensland since August 1, 1879.69
In 1985 in Gerhardy v. Brown70 , Justice Deane stated, "Yet, almost
two centuries on, the generally accepted view remains that the common
law is ignorant of any communal native title or other legal claim on
the Aboriginal clans or peoples even to ancestral tribal lands on which
they still live". 7'
It is evident from the above analysis that the attitude adopted by
the Australian courts72 is difficult to reconcile with international law.
67 Id. at 408. For a useful discussion, see Hookey, Settlement and Sovereignty
in P. HANKS & B. KEON-COHEN, ABORIGINES AND THE LAW 1 (1984).
- 148 C.L.R. 1 (1981).
69 Id. at 19.
10 Gerhardy v. Brown, 59 A.L.R. 311 (1985).
" Id. at 346.
72 See Council of the Municipality of Randwick v. Rutledge, 102 C. L. R. 54
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Since the Aborigines had a political and social organization, their
lands could not properly be characterized as terra nullius. When
Captain Cook was departing England to "discover" Australia he had
specific instructions from the Admiralty:
You are also with the consent of the Natives to take possession of
convenient situations in the country in the name of the King of
Great Britain or if you find the country uninhabited take possession
for His Majesty by setting proper marks and inscriptions as first
discoverers and possessors .... 71
Instead, he cut an inscription in a tree, raised the British flag and
ignored the Aborigines totally. Not only did Captain Cook act con-
trary to established international law, he also violated the instructions
of his superiors.
Apart from one recorded attempt to obtain land from the Abo-
rigines, the practice was to settle the country without regard to them.
In 1835, John Batman acquired some 600,000 acres in the Port Philip
area by way of a "treaty" with the Dutigulla people; the consideration
was some blankets, other sundry items, and an annual rent.74 How-
ever, Governor Bourke who shared the view that Australia was terra
nullius, by the Proclamation of August 26, 1835, declared that, "every
such treaty, bargain or contract with the Aboriginal Natives . . . is
void and of no effect against the rights of the Crown." 5 The attempt
by Batman to comply with the dictates of international law was
nipped in the bud.
What then was the justification for classifying what was at the
time known as New Holland as a terra nullius? The claim has been
that the Aborigines lacked a political organization with settled law.
(1959); Milirrpum v. Nabalco, 17 F. L. R. 141 (1971) (the Gove Land Rights Case).
In the Gove Land Rights Case, although Justice Blackburn held that the Aborigines
had a socio-political organization, he took the view that he was bound by Cooper
v. Stuart. Id. This view has been criticized. See, e.g., Hookey, The Gove Land
Rights Case: A Judicial Dispensation for the Taking of Aboriginal Lands in Aus-
tralia?, 5 F. L. R. 85 (1972).
,1 These instructions were dated July 30, 1768. JOURNAL OF CAPTAIN JAMES COOK
ON His VOYAGES OF DISCOVERY, supra note 3, at cc/xxii (emphasis added). Similarly,
Governor Philip was instructed to "open an intercourse with the natives and to
conciliate their affections, enjoining all our subjects to live in amity and kindness
with them." H.R.A., supra note 5.
1, John Batman's "treaties" are reprinted in J. BoNWICK, PORT PHnILL' SETTLE-
MENT 212-15 (1983).
" Proclamation of August 26, 1835, quoted in 17 F. L. R. at 257. See also S.
HARRIS, IT'S COMING YET 1 (1979).
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First and foremost, it must be remembered that like Africa, Asia,
and the Americas (not to mention Europe), Aboriginal Australia
comprised various communities numbering over 500 "nations". It is
therefore inaccurate to talk of one Aboriginal nation; rather, there
were separate and independent nations,7 6 probably connected with
each other. More importantly, although the Aborigines were hunter-
gatherers leading a nomadic life, they nevertheless had a system of
law and government, and for purposes of international law this was
sufficient. In the Western Sahara opinion, evidence before the In-
ternational Court indicated that at the time of Spanish colonization,
the Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra consisted of nomadic tribes
with social and political organization. The sparsity of the resources
and the spasmodic character of the rainfall compelled the people to
traverse the desert, and on occasions this situation occurred in Mo-
rocco, Mauritania, and Algeria, but significantly, authority in the
tribes was vested in a sheikh and an assembly of its leading members
(Jumaa). A combination of Koranic and African customary law was
applied in the territory. 77
Furthermore, Britain's practice elsewhere operates against it as a
kind of estoppel. In Africa, for example, three types of political
system have been identified:
1. "[P]olitical relations are coterminous with kinship relations and
the political structure and kinship organization are completely
fused";"
2. Institutionalized administrative machinery with king, military,
etc.;
3. Uncentralized political authority with no holders of political
power at the center. This type has been referred to as the
"segmentary lineage system." 79
These different types of political systems, particularly the uncen-
tralized ones, were not exclusive to Africa. In South America, the
76 As a political concept in recent times "the Aboriginal nation" perhaps exists.
In law, however, its existence is doubtful. In Coe v. The Commonwealth of Australia,
53 A. L. R. 403, counsel made the mistake of referring to the Aboriginal nation.
In the Western Sahara opinion, the I.C.J. accepted the existence of independent
and autonomous emirates and tribes but rejected the sovereignty of the Bilad Shin-
guitte (or Mauritanian entity) because it was not a state, a federation, nor even a
confederation. 1975 I.C.J. at 49-52, 55.
7 1975 I.C.J. at 33-55.
71 M. FORTES & E. EVANs-PRITCHARD, AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS 6-7 (1940).
79 Id. at 5. See also J. MIDDLETON & D. TAIT, TRIBES WITHOUT RULERS 3-16
(1958 & reprint 1964).
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Maya, Techuelche, and other Patagonian and Pampean peoples of
the Chilean archipelago, in sharp contrast to the highly centralized
Aztec Empire, had uncentralized administrative machines.8 0 For pres-
ent purposes, it is important that whatever one's perception of these
political systems, their lands as a general rule were not regarded as
terra nullius. The British who acquired Iboland (later Biafra and now
divided into states in the eastern part of Nigeria) did not settle it as
an occupatio despite the fact that the Ibos did not have kings and
queens. The Tallensi of what is today Northern Ghana, the Kikuyu
of Kenya, the Nuer of Sudan, the Tiv of West Africa, and many
others who had no centralized political systems did not lose their
lands on the grounds that these lands were ownerless. A number of
examples can be cited from various parts of the world to buttress
the point."1
This evidence raises questions about Australian courts that hold in
the late twentieth century that at the time of British colonization of
Australia there was "no established system of law of European type
[and that Australia was] a territory which by European standards
had no civilized inhabitants or settled law."81 2 It is doubtful if this
position can be sustained in international law. There has never been
a requirement that all governmental institutions be modelled after
those of the Europeans. Even writers who talked of "civilization"
did not provide a yardstick by which it was to be measured. It is
tantamount to Eurocentrism 83 to insist, as do the Australian courts,
on the existence of "civilization". The International Court of Justice
10 See, e.g., J. STEWARD & L. FARON, NATIVE PEOPLES OF SOUTH AMERICA (1959);
H. HERRING, supra note 37.
sI There is abundant authority for British recognition of prior ownership of land
by indigenous people. St. Catherines Milling and Lumber Co. v. R., 14 App. Cas.
46 (1888)(Canada); Attorney-General for Quebec v. Attorney-General for Canada,
1 App. Cas. 401 (1921)(Canada); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 48 (Cranch) (1810)(U.S.A.);
Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 240 (Wheat) (1823)(U.S.A.); Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. 405 (Pet.) (1832)(U.S.A.). Treaty of Waitangi Hoani Teheuheu Tukino v.
Aotea District Maori Land Board, (1941) App. Cas 308 (New Zealand).
82 Coe v. The Commonwealth of Australia, 53 A. L. R. 403, 408 (1979)(opinion
of Gibbs, J.). Similar language was used by Justice Blackburn in Milirrpum v.
Nabalco, 17 F. L. R. 141, 243-45 (Gove Land Rights Case).
83 Eurocentrism may be defined as the practice whereby there remain "settled
habits of thought which have led to the acceptance, mostly uncritical, of European
(and Western ) intellectual and socio-cultural traditions as the invariable, if not
superior frameworks for enquiry." Baxi, Some Remarks on Eurocentrism and the
Law of Nations in R. ANAND, ASIAN STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNIVERSAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1972); see also Andrews, supra note 41. It is more accurate
to talk of "Aussiecentrism" in the Australian context.
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debunked the "civilization" theory in the Western Sahara opinion.
Judge Forster in his separate opinion observed that if one arbitrarily
required that the socio-political systems of non-European nations
"should be a carbon copy of European Institutions",8 4 then on that
basis alone almost all territories outside Europe would be declared
terra nullius.
His Honor Justice Murphy was quite correct when he stated that
the holding in Cooper v. Stuart "may be regarded as having been
made in ignorance or as convenient falsehood to justify the taking
of aborigine's land." ' 85 In the 1830s the British realized the enormity
of the illegality that was being committed by their representatives
"down under". A Report of the House of Commons Select Com-
mittee in 1837 concluded: "In the formation of these settlements it
does not appear that the territorial rights of the natives were con-
sidered .... ,,s6 To be fair, there were some isolated parts of the
continent which could quite properly be classified as terra nullius.
For example, King Island, situated In the middle of the Bass Strait
between Tasmania and the mainland, was occupatio.87
To summarize, the mere fact that the Australian Aborigines did
not have a visibly centralized institutional structure like the Maoris
across the Tasman-or in fact like the many Polynesian kingdoms
in the Pacific region-provided no justification for declaring their
lands ownerless. Both under international law and Britain's own
practice, it is clear that the Australia was acquired in violation of
the rule that wherever there were people living in a territory with a
social and political organization, however "crude and rudimentary", 88
those territories were not terra nullius.
With regard to the present discussion, several additional issues
require comment. First, some Australians, unable to justify the set-
tlement theory, have resorted to classifying the acquisition of the
country as one of conquest. As recently as 1983, the Federal Minister
for Aboriginal Affairs stated: "We have to face the fact that Australia
84 1975 I.C.J. at 103.
53 A. L. R. at 412.
86 Report of the House of Commons Select Committee, quoted in Milirrpum v.
Nabalco, 17 F. L. R. 141, 257 (1971)(the Gove Land Rights Case). This document
was written two years after John Batman's "treaty" had been declared illegal.
87 For details and other examples consult the pre-British map of Australia in N.
TINDALE, ABORIGINAL TRIBES OF AUSTRALiA 327 (1974).
11 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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as a country was conquered, not settled." 8 9 Even if one accepts for
the sake of argument that the continent was conquered, 9° it can be
argued pari passu that since the Aborigines never acquiesced in, nor
conceded, defeat, a war situation technically still exists. Due to the
vastness of the territory, the small size of the Aboriginal population,
the difficulty of the terrain, and above all the absence of a centralized
governmental system with an army, it was not possible for the Ab-
origines to engage the British in a full scale war as the Asante and
the Zulus, for example, did in Africa. Rather, resort was made to
guerilla warfare, or what has been described as "frontier violence", 9'
which was "frequent ' 92 throughout the continent. His Honor Justice
Murphy summarized it in the Coe case: "Although the Privy Council
referred in Cooper v. Stuart to peaceful annexation, the Aborigines
did not give up their lands peacefully; they were killed or removed
forcibly from their lands by United Kingdom forces or the European
19 Statement by Clyde Holding at a seminar, May 7, 1983, on Aboriginal Cus-
tomary Law, cited in C. TATZ, ABORIGINES AND THE AGE OF ATONEMENT 5 (paper
for the 3rd Int'l Conf. on Hunter-Gatherers, Bad Homburg, F.R.G., June 13-16,
1983). As the colonization was in progress some British residents expressed concern:
Our brave and conscientious Britons whilst taking possession of of their
territory, have been most careful and anxious to make it universally known
that Australia is not a conquered country ... and ... have repeatedly
commanded that it must never be forgotten 'that our possession of this
territory is based on a right of occupancy. A Right of occupancy. Amiable
sophistry!' Why not say readily at once, the right of power? We have seized
upon the country, and shot down the inhabitants, until the survivors have
found it expedient to submit to our rule. We have acted exactly as Julius
Caesar did when he took possession of Britain. But Caesar was not so
hypocritical as to pretend any moral right to possession ... We have a
right to our Australian possessions; but it is the right of conquest and we
hold them with the grasp of power.
E.W. LANDOR, THE BUSHMAN OR LIFE IN A NEW COUNTRY 187-9 (1847), quoted in
H. REYNOLDS, ABORIGINES AND SETTLERS 102 (1972) (emphasis added).
90 Under British (and thus Australian) common law there are benefits to be derived
by the Aborigines in having the country reclassified as conquered, in that the people
of a conquered colony are recognized as such, and consequently their laws and
rights are recognized until abrogated by legislation of the conquerer. On the contrary,
in the case of a settled colony the laws of the settlor take imediate effect, overriding
any existing law. See Latham, The Law and the Commonwealth, in SURVEY OF
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS 1, 7 (1937), quoted in Windeyer A Birthright and
Inheritance, [1962] TASMANIA UNIVERSITY LAW REviEw 635.
91 H. REYNOLDS, THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FRONTIER 200 (1981).
92 1 C. ROWLEY, THE DESTRUCTION OF ABORIGINAL SOCIETY 5 (1980). See also
C. TURNBULL, BLACK WAR-THE EXTERMINATION OF THE TASMANIAN ABORIGINES
(1974).
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colonists in what amounted to attempted (and in Tasmania almost
complete) genocide." 93
Second, it has been suggested that "if there were any defect in
Australia's title, the rule of prescription would apply to overturn the
defect and to vest sovereign title in the Commonwealth Govern-
ment. ' 94 Prescription has been explained as a possession or situation
which "had been consolidated by a constant and sufficient long
practice in the face of which the attitude of governments bears witness
to the fact that they do not consider it to be contrary to international
law." 95 It is doubtful if prescription can be applied in the Australian
context. As it was pointed out in the Eastern Greenland Case,96
prescription is normally relied upon to demonstrate superior title. In
that case, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that
Denmark's claim to Eastern Greenland was superior to Norway's.
The contest was for superior title between Denmark and Norway,
not between either of these states and the Eskimos. 97 The Aborigines
have been in Australia since time immemorial. They do not have the
burden of proof. Prescription would be relevant if there were com-
petition between the British and, say, the French 9s or Dutch. To
make the point clearer, assume that the Netherlands were to stake
claim to Tasmania on the ground that the territory was "claimed"
by Abel Tasman in 1642.99 It is submitted that the British (and so
the Australian Government) would be able to argue convincingly that
since they have had "continuous and peaceful display of the functions
of state,"' 0 for a long time, prescription has operated to perfect
their title to Tasmania.
91 Coe v. Commonweath of Australia, 53 A. L. R. 403, 412 (1979). In Davis v.
Commonwealth of Australia, 61 A. L. R. 32 (1987), the plaintiff in paragraph
seventeen of the Statement of Claim referred inter alia to "the genocide and ex-
termination of all full-blooded Aborigines in Tasmania and the attempted genocide
of Aborigines in other parts of Australia." Id. at 34.
94 PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, Two HUNDRED YEARs LATER . . . REPORT BY THE
SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL AFFARs ON THE FEAS-
IBILITY OF A COMPACT, OR "MAKARRATA" BETWEEN THE COMMONWEALTH AND AB-
ORIGINAL PEOPLE 46, 3.37 (1983). [hereinafter SENATE MAKARRATA REPORT.]
95 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).
- Legal Status of Greenland Case (Den. v. Nor.), [1933] P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
53 (Apr. 5) (hereinafter Eastern Greenland Case).
9 Id.
98 See infra note 114.
99 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
100 Island of Palmas (or Miangas) Arbitration (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 829 (1928); Arbitral Award on the Subject of the Difference Relative to
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In any case, if prescription were applicable to the Australian sit-
uation, it is equally well established in international law that in order
successfully to rely on that rule, the purported display of state au-
thority must be peaceful and unchallenged. In the Chamizal Arbi-
tration,10' the United States sought to rely on, among other things,
"undisturbed, uninterrupted and unchallenged possession."'' 0 2 The
International Boundary Commission dismissed the argument because
Mexico had "constantly challenged and questioned" the United States
claim through diplomatic protests which were appropriate in the
circumstances. 13 Similarly, the Aborigines have never conceded de-
feat. 1°4 By way of illustration, the Central Australian Aboriginal
organizations in a submission to the Australian Senate in 1983 stated:
Since 1788 our nation has been invaded by ever-increasing numbers
of Europeans who, with superior weapons, have attempted to defeat
our people and destroy our law and culture and seize, without
compensation, our land. We have never conceded defeat and will
continue to resist this on-going attempt to subjugate us. The crimes
against our nation have been carefully hidden from those who now
make up the constituency of the settler state .... The Aboriginal
people have never surrendered to the European invasion and assert
that sovereignty over all of Australia lies with them. The settler
state has never recognized the prior ownership of this land belonging
to the Aboriginal nation.'0 5
The exercise of authority over the Aborigines has been anything
but peaceful. These days, the struggle is fought largely in the courts
and through street marches and demonstrations.'°6 At the time of the
bicentenary celebrations, there were at least two relevant cases in the
High Court of Australia. In Mabo v. State of Queensland,10 7 the
the Sovereignty Over Clipperton Island (France v. Mexico)(1931), reprinted in 26
AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932)(the Clipperton Island Arbitration); 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 53 (Apr. 5).
101 Chamizal Arbitration (U.S. v. Mexico), reprinted in 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 782
(1911) (proceedings of the International Boundary Commission); see generally John-
son, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law 27 BIuT. Y. B. INT'L L. 332
(1951).
102 Chamizal, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. at 791, 806.
103 Id. at 806.
104 See infra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
'0' SENATE MAKARRATA REPORT, supra note 94, at 10.
106 The year 1987 was declared by some Aborigines as a year of mourning, a
prelude to the bicentennial, and demonstrations on Australia Day (Jan. 26) are a
matter of course. See, e.g., The Daily Telegraph, Jan. 27, 1987, at 3, 6-7.
107 Mabo v. State of Queensland, 60 A. L. R. 255 (1986) (preliminary judgment).
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plaintiffs, who are Murray Islanders and heads of families of the
Miriam people, directly challenged the validity of the acquisition of
the islands of Mer, Dawar, and Waier, situated in the Torres Strait
and forming part of the State of Queensland. The plaintiffs' case
included a declaration that since the islands were acquired without
compensation to the indigenous people, that acquisition is invalid. 108
The second case is Davis v. Commonwealth of Australia'°9 in which
three Aborigines challenged the Australian Bicentennial Authority Act
of 1980, as amended, as invalid. The functions of the Bicentennial
Authority are stated as follows:
The primary object for which the Authority is established is to
formulate, to plan, to develop, to promote, to co-ordinate and to
implement consistently with applicable legislation of the Parliament
of the Commonwealth, a national programme of celebrations and
activities ("the Programme") to commemorate the bicentenary in
1988 of the first European settlement in Australia .... 10
One of the grounds of the challenge was that, as descendants of the
indigenous inhabitants of Australia, the Aborigines have a special
interest in objecting to legislation designed to assist the celebration
of the settlement and occupation of the country by people who are
not indigenous to the continent.
The issue has also been raised, indirectly but ingeniously, in the
case R. v. Walker,"' Denis Walker, a member of the Nunukel tribe
who live on Stradbroke Island in Queensland, was charged with
breaking into a dwelling and with two counts of wilful destruction
of property. He refused to enter a plea on the ground that the
Queensland Criminal Court had no jurisdiction to try him. Repre-
senting himself, he argued that Captain Cook claimed possession of
Australia illegally by breaching his instructions. Walker was found
guilty of the two counts of wilful destruction and he appealed to the
Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal. Again, he represented himself.
J0 Id.
,09 Davis v. Commonwealth of Australia, 61 A. L. R. 32, 36 (Jan. 1987). In a
preliminary judgment handed down in late 1986, Chief Justice Gibbs struck the
parts of the complaint directly dealing with the acquisition of Australia on the
ground that they would tend to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action. Id.
The case was finally disposed of in December 1988. 63 A.L.R. 35 (1989).
110 Memorandum of Association of the Authority, cl. 3, registered under The
Companies Ordinance 1962 (A.C.T.), quoted in 61 A. L. R. at 33 (1987).
I Unreported Judgment. A summary is reported in 2 ABORIGINAL LAW BULLETIN
14 (April 1989).
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On December 1, 1988, the appeal was dismissed. Two points are
noteworthy about the case. First, it was admitted on behalf of the
Crown, as a matter of historical fact, that the Nunukel people oc-
cupied Stradbroke Island prior to and after 1770; that they had a
system of government and law; and that the defendant is a descendant
of the Nunukel people. The Crown also admitted that Captain Cook
failed to comply with his instructions to take possession of "con-
venient situations" on the continent "with the consent of the native
peoples". In dismissing Walker's appeal, the Queensland Court of
Criminal Appeal held that Captain Cook's claim has since been
validated by a combination of imperial, colonial, state and federal
statutes. The second point of note is the observation made by the
court that the British claim of sovereignty over Australia "raises the
issue of how it is that judges and others in Queensland apply ...
these laws to Stradbroke Island; and, conversely, why the Nunukel
people, who in times long past once exercised sovereignty over Strad-
broke Island, are, without any formal displacement of their own legal
system, now expected and obliged to submit to laws not of their own
making". 1 12 When the matter came before the High Court by way
of an application for special leave to appeal, the Court avoided
tackling the issue head-on on the ground that the issues which counsel
sought to put before the High Court had not been fully argued in
the court below.
In a nutshell, prescription is inapplicable in the Australian context.
Even if it were relevant, it is clear that the continuing protests of
the Aborigenes would have undermined it. "A significant justification
for the British taking of Aboriginal land was that the Aboriginal
people weren't using it or cultivating it in a European sense. As a
consequence, according to European concepts, they had forfeited any
right of possession."" 3 This is perhaps the least legitimate argument
of all, and it does not merit any serious comment.
There is also the issue of the degree of effective occupation. Aus-
tralia was actually settled in states over a long period of time. Since
the Aborigine peoples were separate, autonomous entities, the loss
of one community did not necessarily mean the loss of all. However,
112 Id.
"' SENATE MAKARRATA REPORT, supra note 94, at 38, para. 3.21. "They bestowed
no labour upon the land and that-and that only-it is which gives a right of
property to it." Herald Sydney (1838), quoted in FrST REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMMITTEE OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY UPON ABORIGINEs 33 (1980).
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no useful purpose would be served by pressing this argument further
since the British did not face any real competition in occupying and
acquiring the country.11 4 The difficulty, rather, was that at the ap-
pointment of Governor Philip as the first Governor of New South
Wales (the eastern half of the country), his jurisdiction was defined
as extending from the extreme north all the way south to Tasmania,
"including all the islands adjacent in the Pacific Ocean.' '1 5 It would
seem that the British claim to the whole eastern half was much more
extensive than what Captain Cook had in fact "discovered" and
"claimed" in 1770.116 The attempt to establish, and the later exercise
of, jurisdiction over Van Diemen's land (Tasmania) was extraordinary
as no British had at the time landed in the territory. The Dutch had
first "discovered" and "claimed" it in 1642. How then could the
British claim "all the islands adjacent in the Pacific"? Once again,
as there is no contest by either the Dutch or the French, this issue
is now a moot point.
Finally, a comment on a "critical date" is not out of place. An
international tribunal seized of the matter will have to establish an
appropriate point in time at which the colonization of Australia
became crystallized. In both the Clipperton Island and Eastern Green-
land cases, it was found necessary to establish such a date. In the
Western Sahara opinion, the International Court of Justice did not
think it necessary to establish a "critical date" as it was not deciding
a contentious issue. Rather, it was appropriate to talk of a "critical
period" defined as "not only the beginning of the colonization whether
defacto or de jure, but also the time of its consolidation by occupation
or pacification."'1 7 In the Australian context, such a "critical period"
will need to be established because the colonization occurred over
many decades.
V. FINAL COMMENTS
Some might ask: Even if the acquisition of Australia was made
contrary to international law, so what? Two hundred years have
" There were attempts by the French to claim parts of Australia. For instance,
Baudin in 1800 on board Le Geograph&, assisted by Le Naturaliste, tried to land
in Tasmania, and later in Western Australia. See E. SCOTT, THE LIFE OF CAPTAIN
MATTHEW FLINDERS, R.N. (1914)(especially Chs. 13, 15, and 18).
"I 1 H.R.A. 1-2.
16 For a fuller discussion, see Evatt, The Acquisition of Territory in Australia
and New Zealand in GROTIAN SOCIETY PAPERS 1968, at 16 (C. Alexandrowicz ed.
1970).
"1 1975 I.C.J. 12, 137 (separate opinion of Judge De Castro).
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passed. What is the utility of raising and pursuing the matter when
we are less than two decades away from the twenty-first century? In
the Western Sahara opinion, Spain argued strenuously that the ques-
tions put to the Court were academic, irrelevant, and devoid of
purpose." 8 The learned judges disagreed and satisfied themselves that
their opinion was sought "for a practical and contemporary pur-
pose."' 1 9 Of course, the Australian case is not "on all fours" with
Western Sahara. In the latter, the controversy was between the in-
dependent states of Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania (Algeria and
Zaire participated). In the former, only Australia is recognized as a
state. The Aborigines for international law purposes have no separate
locus standi; under contemporary international law, they will at best
be entitled to some special rights as a minority or indigenous group.
20
A powerful weapon for the Australian Government is Article 2(7) of
the United Nations Charter, ' 2 for it can be argued that the Aboriginal
question is a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
Australia and therefore not an appropriate subject for an international
tribunal.
Nevertheless, one cannot dismiss the matter summarily. 2 2 The issue
is constantly arising and if the attitude of the High Court of Australia
18 Id. at 20, 21, 29.
19 Id. at 20.
1o See Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 369 (1986); G. BENNETT, ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1978). See also Nettheim, Indigenous Rights, Human Rights and Australia,
61 AusmT. L.J. 291 (1987). Coincidentally, 1988, the bicentennial year of European
settlement of Australia, was also significant for the development of indigenous rights.
The United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (Subcommission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities) considered an initial
draft for a Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights. Secondly, the International
Labor Organization completed the first stage of the two-year revision of its 1957
Convention No. 107 (Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries).
In addition, the Aborigines may be entitled to special treatment as a monority.
121 The U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. Article 2(7) provides:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice
the appliction of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Id.
22 On November 2, 1976, in a melodramatic demonstration of the absurdity of
classifying Australia as terra nullius, a party of Aborigines landed in a boat at
Dover Beach, England, and in the presence of witnesses proclaimed sovereignty over
the entire United Kingdom on behalf of the Australian Aborigines. Coe v. Com-
monwealth of Australia, 53 A. L. R. 403, 407 (1979).
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(the highest judicial body) is any indication, then it is clear that the
Australian courts are not the appropriate forum in which to question
the validity of the acquisition of the continent. The logical conclusion
is that such legal flexing of muscles will have to be done outside the
Australian jurisdiction. It should be noted that the matter is raised
almost annually before the Human Rights Commission in Geneva.'
23
However, the issue of whether the Aborigines will have access to the
International Court of Justice is beyond the scope of this paper. 24
Assuming that the Aborigines are able to find an appropriate forum
and their claim is vindicated, what next? It is inconceivable that
political power would be handed over to the indigenous people on
a silver platter. It is also unlikely that Australia would be Balkanized
or dismembered into bantustans. For a start, with the possible ex-
ception of the northern parts of the country, the Aborigines are in
the minority. In a total population of about 16 million Australians,
the Aboriginal population is no more than a quarter of a million.
Nevertheless, successful litigation by the Aborigines would bring
pressure to bear on the Federal Government to seek a negotiated
settlement. In April 1979, the National Aboriginal Conference passed
a resolution calling for a Makarrata25 between the Australian Gov-
ernment and the Aborigines. After extensive investigation, the Aus-
tralian Senate in 1983 recommended inter alia that:
The Government should, in consultation with the Aboriginal people,
give consideration, as the preferred method of legal implementation
of a compact, to the insertion within the Constitution of a provision
along the lines of section 105A, which should confer a broad power
on the Commonwealth to enter into a compact with representatives
of the Aboriginal people.1 26
123 The National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Services Secretariat in Sydney has
N.G.O. Category 2 Status with ECOSOC, and this entitles it to participate in the
proceedings of the Human Rights Commission.
14 See, e.g., Hodgson, Aboriginal Australians and the World Court I - Sovereignty
by Conquest, [1985] NEW ZEALAND L.J. 33; Hodgson, Aboriginal Australians and
the World Court II-The Advisory Jurisdiction of the World Court, [1985] NEW
ZEALAND L.J. 64.
23 Makarrata is an Aboriginal word that translates as "a coming together after
a struggle". The resolution originally used the term "Treaty of Commitment" but
this was later abandoned because of the international implications of the word
"treaty". See Keon-Cohen, The Makarrata, A Treaty Within Australia Between
Australians, Some Legal Issues, 57 CURRENT AFFAIRS BULLETIN 4 (1981); ABORIGINAL
TREATY COMMITTEE, A MAKARRATA THE LEGAL OPTIONS (1981).
126 SENATE MAKARRATA REPORT, supra note 87 at xii (Recommendation 1). Earlier,
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Thus far nothing has happened, and Australia is still a long way
from the recognition accorded to indigenous people in the United
States, 2 7 Canada,128 and New Zealand. 129 But one should not lose
sight of the fact that over the last decade a number of Federal
Government-funded Aboriginal organizations have been formed across
the country. In September 1987, the Australian Prime Minister an-
nounced that his government is open to discussion of a "Compact
of Understanding" with Aborigines. It remains to be seen if the
government has the political will to see this process through. 30
POSTSCRIPT
Since this paper was written a number of important developments
have occurred which ought to be noted here. On June 12, 1988, the
Prime Minister of Australia, after discussions with Aboriginal rep-
resentatives, made the following statement at Barunga in the Northern
Territory:
1. The Government affirms that it is committed to work for a
negotiated treaty with Aboriginal people.
2. The Government sees the next step as Aborigines deciding what
on Feb. 20, 1975, the Senate unanimously adopted the following motion of Senator
Neville Bonner, the only Aborigine to have sat in the Australian Parliament:
That the Senate accepts the fact that the indigenous people of Australia,
now known as Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, were in possession
of this entire nation prior to the 1788 First Fleet landing at Botany Bay,
urges the Australian Government to admit prior ownership by the said
indigenous people and introduce legislation to compensate the people now
known as Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders for dispossession of their
land.
AUSTRALIAN SENATE JOURNALS 267, reprinted in id. at 12.
127 Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to legislate regarding
the Indians. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. In Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30
U.S. 1, 12 (Peters) (1831), Chief Justice Marshall described the Indians as "domestic
dependent nations." Id.
121 The Canadian Constitution provides, "The existing aboriginal and treaty rights
of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed." CAN.
CONST. art. II, § 35(1).
129 The Treaty of Waitangi Act, 2 N.Z. Stat. 825 (1975), as amended by 3 N.Z.
Stat. 1335 (1985), provides for the "observance and confirmation of the principles
of the Treaty of Waitangi." There is a separate tribunal for achieving this goal.
See New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney General [1987], 1 N.Z.L.R. 641, which
affirmed the importance of the treaty. The Maoris are nevertheless still fighting for
rangatiratanga or self-determination.
130 See Malone, A Test of Labor's Commitment, Canberra Times, Sept. 5, 1987,
at 2.
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they believe should be in the treaty.
3. The Government will provide the necessary support for Aboriginal
people to carry out their own consultations and negotiations: this
could include the formation of a committee of seven senior Abo-
rigines to oversee the process and to call an Australia-wide meeting
or convention.
4. When the Aborigines present their proposals the Government
stands ready to negotiate about them.
5. The Government hopes that these negotiations can commence
before the end of 1988 and will lead to an agreed treaty in the life
of this Parliament.1
31
As of the time of going to press with the present article, nothing
concrete had been done towards achieving the proposals in this state-
ment.
Second, on August 23, 1988, a joint resolution of both Houses of
the Federal Parliament enjoined the Federal Government to "further
promote reconciliation with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
citizens providing recognition of their special place in the Common-
wealth of Australia". 3 2 On the next day, the Minister for Aboriginal
Affairs placed before the House of Representatives the Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Commission Bill. 3 3 This legislation will
establish the new Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission
(ATSIC), "a black pseudo-parliament",' 134 a twenty-member Com-
mission with 17 zonal representatives elected by 1200 councillors from
60 regional councils around Australia. In a speech, the Minister
stressed that the legislation "represents the product of a very extensive
and exhaustive consultative process"' 35 and is "a significant and major
step towards the achievement of self-determination for the indigenous
peoples of Australia".1 36
Paragraphs 2-4 of the final version of the Bill read:
3I Statement of Bob Hawke, reprinted in Crawford, The Aboriginal Legal Her-
itage: Aboriginal Public Law and the Treaty Proposal, 63 AUSTL. L. J. 392, 399-
400 (June 1989). The Aboriginal statement in reply is reprinted at 402-03. The two
together are known as "The Barunga Statement".
132 COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, HOUSE OF REPS., Aug 23, 1988,
137; COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, SENATE, Aug. 23, 1988, 56.
' COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, HOUSE OF REPS., Aug. 24, 1988,
251-56.
114 Owen, Aboriginal Bill Lacks Grassroots Support, The Weekend Australian,
September 2-3, 1989, 5.
133 Statement of Gerry Hand, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, supra note 133 at
256.
136 Gerry Hand, supra note 133 at 252.
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. .. whereas the people whose descendants are now known as the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples of Australia were the
prior occupiers and original owners of this land;
And whereas they were dispossessed by subsequent European
occupation and have no recognized rights over land yet recognized
by the Courts other than those granted or recognized by the Crown;
And whereas that dispossession occurred without compensation
and no serious attempt was made to reach a lasting and equitable
agreement with them on the use of their land...
* . . [it should be] the intention of the people of Australia . .. to
ensure for all time that the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
peoples receive that full recognition and status within the Australian
nation to which history, their prior ownership and occupation of
the land, and their rich and diverse culture entitle them to aspire...
[and that there should] be reached with the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander peoples a real and lasting reconciliation of these
matters. 3 7
17 The proposal to establish ATSIC (a statutory body which will amalgamate the
current Department of Aboriginal Affairs and the Aboriginal Development Com-
mission, and incorporate the Aboriginal Hostels Ltd. and the Institute of Aboriginal
Studies) was first announced to the Parliament on December 10, 1987. The original
draft preamble and the details of the proposal are set out in G. HAND, FOUNDATIONS
FOR THE FUTURE [POLICY STATEMENT] (1987). The bill, which has since been amended,
has passed the House of Representatives and after some more amendments it is
expected to be passed by the Senate by the end of 1989.
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THE DEAN RUSK AWARD
The Dean Rusk Award is presented each year to the student whose
paper is chosen by a panel of distinguished judges as the best student
international law article submitted by students from Georgia law
schools. The Award program is administered in honor of Dean Rusk,
formerly United States Secretary of State, and currently professor of
law at the University of Georgia School of Law.
The judges for the 1988-89 Award were Professor Louis B. Sohn,
Woodruff Professor of International Law, University of Georgia
School of Law and Beemis Professor of International Law Emeritus
Harvard Law School; Professor Thomas M. Schoenbaum, Rusk Pro-
fessor of Law and Director of the Dean Rusk Center for International
and Comparative Law, University of Georgia School of Law; and
Mr. Kenneth W. Hansen, Senior Commercial Counsel, Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation, Washington, D.C..
The 1988-89 Award was presented to Mr. Jeffrey D. Stieb for his
paper, Survey of United States Jurisdiction Over High Seas Narcotics
Trafficking. The Georgia Journal congratulates Mr. Stieb for his
achievement and is pleased to print his paper in the following pages.
The Journal also is grateful to Professor Rusk for his service to
the School of Law and the Journal. Throughout his numerous years
in government, including positions at the United States Department
of State as Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs, Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and as Secretary of State
from 1961 to 1969, Professor Rusk served our country selflessly and
with great distinction.
In the same manner, he has served since 1970 as the Samuel H.
Sibley Professor of International Law at the University of Georgia
School of Law, and as Advisor to the Georgia Journal from its
inception that year. The Journal has benefited tremendously from
his guidance, and the 1988-89 Managing Board expresses its deepest
gratitude to Professor Rusk for his invaluable support and assistance
to the Journal over the last twenty years.

